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On the Usefulness of a Flat
Economics to the World of Faith
Andrew P. Morriss1
LINK TO ABSTRACT
In his introduction, Daniel Klein asks “Is economics suffering from an
undue flatness?” and, if it does, whether “religious or quasi-religious formulations”
might provide the needed depth (2014, 97). Klein joins some august company
(Deirdre McCloskey, Vernon Smith) in concluding that there is too much flattening
and proceeds to raise some provocative questions about the role religion might play
in addressing the problem.
Before we get to whether religion can help, it will be helpful to consider the
flatness. There is little question that economics flattens the perception of human
nature and human existence. Focus is a good thing in solving problems. Occam’s
razor is helpful, unless it eliminates key variables. A paper map is a flat rep-
resentation of geographic data, yet its flatness is integral to its usefulness. The map
is portable in a way that a ‘deeper’ representation is not. Deeper representations
provide other useful functions. For example, in Guatemala City there is a city-block
sized relief map of Guatemala, which provides a sense of the country’s geography
not available from even the most detailed paper map marked with contour lines.
But the relief map cannot be folded up and put in my pocket, and so it is less helpful
in finding my way from Antigua to Chichicastenango than is the paper map. So
flatness alone is not a problem—only what Klein terms undue flatness.
If we think about the degree of flatness as the result of a tradeoff between
the costs and benefits of more detail, we’ll end up with different maps for different
purposes. And flatness is really a multidimensional issue. Thus a highway map is
flat in not representing a variety of things. It won’t tell me the religious preferences
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of the people in the area I am driving through or population density or the level
of economic activity. The absence of such details could be either a feature (if I am
driving from A to B, then I don’t particularly care about them and they’d likely
clutter my map) or a bug (if I am trying to find a place to live).
Undue flatness?
To what extent is economics unduly flat? Compared to the Christian
conception of human nature, what McCloskey (2006, 135) terms “Max U” is
certainly flatter. Is it unduly so? It is true that for Christians utility ought not to
be just about material wealth. As Proverbs 30:8 puts it: “Remove far from me
vanity and lies: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient
for me.” That attitude is not what immediately comes to mind when I think of
Max U, although one could play with utility functions to incorporate it. But that
acknowledgment does not mean that a utility maximization model is unduly flat; it
rather depends on what we are trying to accomplish. If the goal is a mathematical
model, Max U’s flatness offers significant benefits. The flatness allows us to see
the question being modeled more clearly in at least some cases. Of course, not all
(or perhaps even many) models are useful, so relentlessly applying Max U is not
always going to yield benefits that are worth the cost. But so long as we remember
that models are tools rather than reality, some models are useful. Indeed, one of the
strengths of McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity (2010) is that she deploys economic tools
effectively to make the point that a step beyond just economics is needed to explain
the Industrial Revolution (see Morriss 2010).
Most of the relatively flat models deployed by economists are not, of course,
used to show the limitations of economics; instead they are applied, and helpfully
so, to an array of questions. For example, the economics of religion literature
offers the insight that more demanding denominations are more successful than
less demanding ones. The more demanding denominations, such as those that want
their members to fast on holy days or give up dancing, raise the average intensity
of belief among members by requiring practices that are less costly for believers
than for skeptics. A higher average intensity makes participating in the religion
more rewarding for members. As Laurence Iannaccone (1998, 1482) puts it, “the
pleasure and edification that I derive from a worship service does not depend
solely on what I bring to the service (through my presence, attentiveness, public
singing, and so forth); it also depends on how many other people attend, how
warmly they greet me, how well they sing, how enthusiastically they read and pray,
how deep their commitment, and so forth.” As Iannaccone notes, enriching the
“religious production function” and focusing attention on modeling religion as a
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specialized firm or club, rather than focusing on a simple model of personal utility
maximization, can enhance understanding of the institutions (ibid., 1479-1485).
But there is nothing particularly ‘religious’ about modeling religion as a club, other
than the greater understanding of how religion affects participants that comes from
understanding religion itself. I don’t think Iannaccone is making economics less
flat; I think he’s just found different terrain to map.
Similarly, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark (2005) explain the relative successes
of Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, and Methodists in nineteenth
century America by examining the incentive structure facing the clergy in each. In
short, Methodist circuit riders were highly incentivized to deliver a good experience
because they wanted someone to invite them home afterward for dinner and a place
to stay, and Baptist preachers needed people in pews to put money in the collection
plate to fund the church and pay their salaries. Meanwhile, Congregationalists and
Episcopalians had state support and endowments that disconnected their rewards
from their efforts. Again, I don’t see this as a move away from flat modeling, just
mapping a different space.
That all this is useful is demonstrated by the reaction of the clergy from
a variety of Christian denominations at a conference I organized around this
literature. The participants found these insights exciting. While I have no doubt
that concepts like those which Klein describes in his introduction (coherence,
larger purpose, and universal benevolence) could prove useful, readings based on a
pretty flat utility function and that did not take such things into account provided
ideas that sparked a rich and interesting discussion with relevance to both
economists and clergy.
Is something missing from economics?
Economics’ power comes in part from its ability to explain a great deal with
a remarkably simple model of human motivation. An important part of that power
rests on the testability of hypotheses generated by the model. The best parts of my
graduate education in economics at MIT were my labor economics and industrial
organization classes, in which a series of superb economists (Henry Farber, Robert
Gibbons, Paul Joskow, Thomas Lemieux, Michael Piore, and Jean Tirole) took us
through models and tests of hypotheses in various papers. Farber’s dissecting of
the methodologies of quantitative papers in labor economics, Piore’s combination
of qualitative and quantitative insights into labor markets, and Joskow and Tirole’s
team-taught IO course mixing game theory and econometric evidence were par-
ticular highlights. If anything made me a believer in the methods of economics, it
was those classes.
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But the simplicity of the Max U approach can also mislead. For example,
Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson’s The (Mis)Behavior of Markets: A Fractal
View of Financial Turbulence makes a compelling case that much of modern finance
is built on a set of incorrect assumptions about the distribution of price changes
in financial markets. If they are correct, and they make a persuasive case that they
are, then this is undue flatness. Why haven’t the theories been improved based
on empirical evidence to the contrary? Mandelbrot and Hudson offer a disturbing
explanation:
Habit and convenience. The math is, at bottom, easy and can be made
to look impressive, inscrutable to all but the rocket scientist. Business
schools around the world keep teaching it. They have trained
thousands of financial officers, thousands of investment advisors. In
fact, as most of these graduates learn from subsequent experience,
it does not work as advertised; and they develop myriad ad hoc
improvements, adjustments, and accommodations to get their jobs
done. But still, it gives a comforting impression of precision and
competence. (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2006, 105)
Although Mandelbrot and Hudson don’t use the terminology, this is just turning
the lens of public choice theory on ourselves. The results are as unflattering as they
are when we use it to understand politicians and bureaucrats.
Does faith add to economics?
So there is certainly plenty missing from modern economics. But can we add
things in without losing more than we gain? Klein asks in his introduction whether
there is something that our faiths bring to economic thinking that is lacking or
even precluded by mainstream economics. I don’t think that there is. I do find that
much of religious thinking about economics is horribly confused. But the problem
is more that writers on religious doctrine have failed to understand the economics
than that the economics is hampered by a lack of religious tools.
Fr. Michael Butler is a close friend of mine and the Orthodox priest who led
my family into the Church. When I collaborated with him on a monograph (Butler
and Morriss 2013) jointly informed by economics and our faith, I was pleased
at how few obstacles we found to integrating the two. Since Orthodox theology
lies at the more mystical end of the spectrum of Christian theology, I believe our
ability to reconcile (or at least simultaneously make use of) the faith with economics
offers some strong evidence of the lack of a more general problem. For example,
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Orthodox Christianity has a clear understanding of the fallen nature of man, and
that should inform our choice of methods with which to address social problems.
As we argue, “man’s fallen nature should make us wary of centralizing power in
the hands of government officials who are not exempt from that fallen nature”
(ibid., 73). At the same time, in one of Orthodoxy’s most central prayers, the Jesus
Prayer, we pray repeatedly “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me, the sinner.” And
a consistent refrain in virtually all Orthodox services is the refrain: “Lord have
mercy.” This conception of human nature as fallen and in need of mercy is entirely
consistent with the economic conception of humans as motivated by self-interest.
There may be interesting cases to model of people with richer utility functions that
include universal benevolence, but we get surprisingly far in understanding and
predicting behavior with the quite flat assumption of self-interested individuals. So
I see no inconsistency between my faith and my economics.
Does my faith add something to my economics? I find that religious ideas
help me to understand economics. Robert Nelson has used theological concepts to
great effect in explaining differences among economists (Nelson 1993; 2002) and
between economists and environmentalists (Nelson 2010). And having converted
to Orthodoxy after converting to economics, I can certainly say that my faith adds
a great deal to my life, filling a gap that economics cannot. It has also opened
areas of inquiry that I have just begun to explore and which may in time yield
results in my life as an economist. One example is thinking about the evolution
of the doctrines within the institutions of the Orthodox faith, as compared to the
evolution of doctrine within Catholic and Protestant institutions. Orthodoxy is
more hierarchical than most Protestant denominations but lacks the single central
authority of Catholicism. Do the different institutional structures explain the dif-
ferences in doctrinal evolution? I suspect they play a role, and that helps me make
sense of the different paths of Catholicism and Orthodoxy since 1054. Did the
experience of Western Europe’s myriad competing political jurisdictions
contribute to the fracturing of western Christianity into myriad doctrinal
congregations, by incentivizing rulers to accept and support doctrinal innovations,
while the long periods of political stability in Orthodox lands (Byzantium, imperial
Russia, the Ottomans) lacked those incentives? Again, I suspect so.
An unflattering (to my church) example of how economics and faith might
interact to provide explanatory power is the relationship between church and state
in Orthodox countries. Greece, Romania, Russia, and Serbia do not top lists of
well-governed nations through history. Recently, monks of the Vatopaidi mon-
astery on Mount Athos, an extremely holy place in Orthodoxy, appear to have
been involved in some at-best questionable financial dealings with the Greek state
(Lewis 2010). One reason for such problems might be the Orthodox conception
of symphonia as the organizational principle for church-state relations, a conception
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that poses practical issues for anyone with even a passing acquaintance with public
choice theory. These issues are worth exploring using an understanding of both the
faith and economic theory.
So perhaps the better question is “does economics add something to re-
ligious faith?” I think the answer is unambiguously “yes.” Man’s fallen nature
makes it good for humanity that we do not depend on the benevolence of butchers
and bakers for our meat and bread. As F. A. Hayek notes,
it is one of the necessary conditions of the extension of human co-
operation beyond the limits of individual awareness that the range of
such pursuits be increasingly governed not by shared purposes but by
abstract rules of conduct whose observance brings it about that we
more and more serve the needs of people whom we do not know and
find out needs similarly satisfied by unknown persons. (Hayek 1988,
112)
Honest market exchange is a good thing. A merciful God has not left us dependent
on others’ benevolence, even as He continues to hope we will show the mercy to
others that we seek from Him. Nor does embracing market exchange absolve us
of the requirement to serve our brothers and sisters; rather it enables us to do so
in new ways by freeing us from the drudgery of existence in the Malthusian trap
where humanity labored before the Industrial Revolution. I view the twelvefold
increase in well-being that revolution unleashed as akin to the master entrusting
great wealth to his servants in the Parable of the Talents (Luke 19:12-27). With
more, we are called to do more. And, as Fr. Robert Sirico (2000) of the Acton
Institute has noted, God has given us the incredible opportunity to join Him in
the exhilarating process of Creation by providing us with opportunities to do so in
the business world. Fortunately, even those who don’t answer that call for religious
reasons still produce benefits for others by engaging in honest productive activities
in search of material rewards. But I think it is more likely that the relatively flat
world of economics can provide value to the less flat world of faith than the reverse.
Conclusion
Economics has a great deal to offer precisely because it has a remarkably
clear, simple model of human behavior that allows us to formulate testable
hypotheses about the world. Yet turning everything into maximizing behavior does
threaten to make economics tautological and uninteresting. Expanding the scope
of understanding makes the job more difficult but also more interesting. The
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challenge is to balance the power of the model against the potential of greater
complexity.
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